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OBLIGATIONS-DURATION

NOTES
AND

REVOCABILITY

OF

AN

OFFER-

Defendant subcontractor defaulted on an alleged contract
with the plaintiff to do the roofing work on a house for which
the plaintiff had the general contract. The defendant contended
that he had withdrawn on October 9, 1941, the offer which he
had made to the plaintiff on August 15, 1941. On August 23,
1941, the owners of the proposed residence had accepted the
plaintiff's general bid, into which the defendant's bid for the
roofing had been incorporated. The written contract between
the owners and the plaintiff was recorded on August 25, 1941.
The plaintiff allegedly mailed the defendant a formal acceptance
of his offer on or about September 1, 1941, but the defendant
denies ever receiving the acceptance. After considering all the
conflicting testimony, the judge of the lower court held that the
plaintiff's testimony should prevail, and that a contract had been
created. The appellate judge found no error in this conclusion,
but went on to state that in accordance with the custom prevailing in the building trade in New Orleans, an offer by a subcontractor to a general contractor to do work is irrevocable after
the contractor has used the subcontractor's estimate as a basis
for his offer to the owner and the owner has accepted it. Harris
v. Lillis, 24 So. (2d) 689 (Orl. App. 1946).
Since the evidence established that the plaintiff had accepted
the defendant's bid before he had attempted to withdraw, no
other basis was necessary for the decision. However, the additional finding by the court of the custom in the New Orleans
building trade that a subcontractor's bid becomes irrevocable
when the general contractor's bid, if based upon the subcontractor's, is accepted by the owner provokes further consideration.
Although the court referred to the trade practice as a "custom,"
it would have been more accurately described as a "usage."
These terms are commonly used interchangeably; but, nevertheless, there is a well-recognized distinction between their meanings. Usage is a habitual or customary practice, which may exist
in a specific trade or geographical area, or among a certain class or
segment of people.' It derives its efficacy from the assent of the
parties who are deemed to have contracted with reference to it,
thereby manifesting an intention to conduct themselves accordingly. Custom is usage that has attained the force of law through
long and uniform practice. Unlike usage, custom does not depend on a supposed assent between the contracting parties. "Us1. Restatement, Contracts (1932)
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ages may have the effect of adding to the argument or manifestations of intention provision in accordance with the usage, and
not inconsistent with the argument or manifestations of intention."' 2 In other words once a usage has been established, the
contracting parties are presumed to have knowledge thereof and
to have intended to give it operative effect, unless either knows
that the other has an inconsistent intention.3
By making this finding as to the New Orleans trade usage,
the court indicated that in its opinion the subcontractor intended
to be irrevocably bound at the time the owner accepted the general contract, if the principal contractor had used his bid as a
basis for his own. In effect the court found that an offer may be
rendered irrevocable through a manifestation of such intention
by the offeror either expressly or impliedly. The court therefore
was actually giving effect to Article 1809 of the Revised Civil
Code, even though no mention of it was made. Article 1809 reads
as follows:
"The obligation of a contract not being complete, until the
acceptance, or in cases where it is implied by law, until the
circumstances, which raise such implication, are known to
the party proposing; he may therefore revoke his offer or
proposition before such acceptance, but not without allowing
such reasonable time as from the terms of the offer he has
given, or from the circumstances of the case he may be supposed to have intended to give to the party, to communicate
his determination." 4 (Italics supplied.)

Prior Louisiana jurisprudence' on the subject of the duration
2. Id. at §246 (b).
3. Id. at §247 (c). See also id. at §248.
4. Although the French Civil Code contained no counterpart of Article
1809, the principle expressed therein was a settled part of French doctrine.
Presumably Article 1809 was based on the writings of Toullier. For good
discussions of Article 1809 and the other articles on offer and acceptance
see Comment (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 182; Comment (1931) 5 Tulane
L. Rev. 632; Comment (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 590; and Schwenk, Culpa 4n
Contrahendo In German, French and Louisiana Law (1940), 15 Tulane L.
Rev. 87, 95.
5. Vill~re v. Brognier, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 326 (La. 1814); Des Boulets v. Gravier, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 420 (La. 1823); Bloeker v. Tillman, 4 La. 77 (1832); Curtis
v. Moss, 2 Rob. 367 (La. 1842); Sturgis and Wright v. Arcenaux, 9 La. Ann.
16 (1854); Boyd v. Cox, 15 La. Ann. 609 (1860); Wolf v. Mitchell, Craig and
Co., 24 La. Ann. 433 (1872); Fernandez v. Soulie, 28 La. Ann. 31 (1876); Fredericks v. Fasnacht, 30 La. Ann. 117 (1878); Arendano v. Arthur, 30 La. Ann.
316 (1878); Gordon v. Stubbs, 36 La. Ann. 625 (1884); Miller v. Douville and
Gallagher, 45 La. Ann. 214, 12 So. 132 (1893); Laroussini v. Werlein, 52 La.
Ann. 424, 27 So. 89, 78 Am. St. Rep. 350 (1899); Ferre Canal Co. v. Burgin, 106
La. 309, 30 So. 863 (1901); Nickerson v. Allen Bros., 110 La. 194, 34 So. 410 (1903);
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of an offer has often tended to lose sight of the principle established by this article. The reluctance of the court to apply Article
1809 in its exact terms has been due perhaps to the influence of
the common law where the doctrine of consideration prevails.
Since the common law requires consideration to render an offer
irrevocable, without it, even an express intention on the part of
the offeror to confer an irrevocable power of acceptance would
not be binding. A fo'rtiori an intention to confer an irrevocable
power of acceptance found through the existence of a usage
would be ineffectual to dispense with the requirement of consideration.
Although Article 1809 does not impose a requirement of consideration, a body of doctrine showing the influence of the common law principle of consideration has developed around Article
2462,J which pertains to offers to buy and sell. The supreme court
has said8 that until Article 2462 was amended to provide for the
purchase of an option to buy or sell for any consideration stipulated therein there existed a hiatus in Louisiana law. But under
a proper application of Article 1809 such a thing as an irrevocable
offer to buy and sell did exist prior to 1910, for Article 1809 provides that intention alone, whether expressed or inferred from
the circumstances of the case, is sufficient to disable the offeror
from revoking his offer for the period of time intended. Article
1809 deals with offers in general and may be extended to offers
to buy and sell as well as to any other offers. However, since the
1920 amendment to Article 2462, the court seems to be firmly
Levy v. Levy, 114 La. 239, 38 So. 155 (1905); In re Woodville, 115 La. 810, 40
So. 174 (1905); Union Sawmill Co. v. Lake Lumber Co., 120 La. 106, 44 So. 1000
(1907); Blanks v. Sutcliffe, 122 La. 448, 47 So. 765 (1908); Riley v. Union
Sawmill Co., 122 La. 863, 48 So. 304 (1909); Union Sawmill Co. v. Mitchell,
122 La. 900, 48 So. 317 (1909); Vermilion Sugar Co. v. Vallee, 134 La. 661, 64
So. 670, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 695 (1914); Miller v. Oden, 149 La. 771, 90 So. 167
(1921); Picou v. St. Bernard Parish School Board, 132 So. 130 (La. App.
1924); Howard v. Faciane, 3 La. App. 593 (1926); Haskins Trade Co. v. Cook,
3 La. App. 770 (1926); Hanemann v. Uhrey, 8 La. App. 534 (1928); TimesPicayune Pub. Co. v. Harang, 10 La. App. 242 (1929); Foster v. Morrison,
145 So. 13 (La. App. 1933).

6. Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) 317, §99 et seq.
7. Art. 2462, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A promise to sell, when there exists
a reciprocal consent of both parties as to the thing, the price and terms,

and which, if it relates to immovables, is in writing, so far amounts to a
sale as to give either party the right to enforce specific performance of same.
"One may purchase the right, or option to accept or reject, within a
stipulated time, an offer or promise to sell, after the purchase of such option,

for any consideration therein stipulated, such offer, or promise can not be
withdrawn before the time agreed upon; and should it be accepted within

the time stipulated, the contract or agreement to sell, evidenced by such
promise and acceptance, may be specifically enforced by either party."
8. Moresi v. Burleigh, 170 La. 270, 274, 127 So. 624, 625 (1930).
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wedded to the notion that consideration is a requisite to irrevocability. This jurisprudence, nevertheless, has no necessary application to offers of a different nature and the instant case may
constitute some indication that Article 1809 will be given its intended meaning to such extent.
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REMOVAL OF A MORTGAGED CHATTEL FROM THE PARISH OF RE-

CORDATIN-EFFET-Plaintiff claimed a privilege under the pro-

visions of Act 209 of 19261 for the cost of repairing a truck seized
in Rapides Parish. Intervenor alleged that he was the holder of
unpaid notes secured by a chattel mortgage on the truck recorded in Grant Parish. Plaintiff resisted the intervention on the
ground that he was not affected by a chattel mortgage recorded
only in Grant Parish. Held, the effect of recordation of a chattel
mortgage in the parish where the property is to be located and
in the parish of the mortgagor's domicile, in compliance with
Act 172 of 1944,2 is to give the mortgage effect anywhere in the
state without further recordation. Sinclair v. Crew, 26 So. (2d)
331 (La. App. 1946).
Recordation of chattel mortgages was required in the original
chattel mortgage act of 1912.1 The act provided criminal sanctions for removing the property from the parish of original recordation.' But in 1924, 5 when the question was raised as to enforceability of the mortgage after removal to another parish
without consent of the mortgagee, the court held that the mortgage was not enforceable in the parish to which the property
had been removed without local recordation. In 19366 the statute
was amended to provide that a mortgage recorded where it was
executed and where the mortgagor was domiciled was effective
1. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§5047-5048. This act creates a lien in favor of
owners or operators of garages, or any place where automobiles or other
machinery is repaired. The act gives those persons the right of provisional
seizure to enforce the lien.
2. La. Act 172 of 1944, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5022.3]: "In order to
affect third persons, every chattel mortgage must be by authentic act....
A multiple original . .. shall be filed in the office of the Recorder of Mortgages of the parish where the mortgaged property is to be located ... and
also in the office of the Recorder of Mortgages of the parish of the mortgagor's domicll
Section 4: "...
filing shall be notice to all parties of the existence of
the mortgage .
3. La. Act 65 of 1912.
4. La. Act 65 of 1912, §§ 6, 9.
5. Wilson v. Lowrie, 156 La. 1062, 101 So. 549 (1924). This position was
later affirmed in Gulf Finance and Securities 5025, Co. v. Taylor, 160 La. 945,
107 So. 705 (1926).
6. La. Act 178 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5023, 5025, 5026].

